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ABSTRACT 
Fuentenabia, one of the most outstanding strongholds of the Basque Country, has 
historically been a strategic checkpoint on the land crossing between France and the 
Iberian Peninsula. Due to its milita1y interest, it was many times besieged between the 
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries for its possession and tenitorial contr·ol. 
The siege of Fuentenabia of 1638 is framed within the Franco-Spanish War (1635-
1659) fought parallel to the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). It had essentially a 
Religious character but it was used as a method of tenitmial expansion. This pennanent 
state of war allowed a great development of the fmtification, tr·ansfonning the one 
existing in the Middle Ages by what is now known as Modem Fmtification, adapted to 
the new defensive requirements. 
This paper attempts to analyse through the contempora1y chronicles how the siege 
process was developed and the behaviour of the fmtification as a war machine facing 
the enemy offensive. There is no profound analysis of this siege from a heritage point of 
view. The attacks caused different severiity of damage, and the besieged tried to 
reconstruct their defences and build new elements that hinder the work of the enemy. 
By graphing the city walls, hypothesis of the consequences are suggested as well as the 
works the defenders built to compensate them. 
Keywords: siege ofFuentenabia, Modem Fmtification, graphic representation 
INTRODUCTION 
The evolution from the medieval enclosure to the bastioned fortification occuned due to 
the improvement of weapomy in the second half of the fifteenth century. During the 
Middle Ages, defensive methods enjoyed[ supremacy over a1t ille1y offensive. The 
typology of medieval wall that could not stand the onslaught of new weapons or allow 
the placement and use of a1tille1y in defenders pa1t become obsolete. Only a radical 
change in the fmtification concept could offer to guarantee defence forces surviving a 
long siege. 
In most cases, existing str·ongholds were tr·ansfmmed. But the fact is that the origin of 
the bastion derived from the application of triangular polygonal shapes to solve the 
problelllS caused by these technical advances in a1tille1y [1]. Talk of potential inventors, 
Vasari speaks about Sanmichel, De la Croix points to Antonio da Sangallo [2], but the 
truth is that the bastion was the result of a gradual evolution over several decades with 
marked isolated milestones [3]. 
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Fig. 1. Bidasoa course between Fuentenabia and Behobia, 1609, AGS, M.P.D. 18-32 
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Fig. 2. Fortification plan ofFuentenabia, around 1630, AGS, M.P.D. 13-55 
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War petiods intensified the building activity in Fuentenabia to maintain and improve 
the resisting capacity of the walls from an imminent attack because of its situation. Like 
other settlements in strategic locations, this town in the Bidasoa mouth and French 
border (Fig. 1) had from its miginal fmmdation medieval walls dominated fi:om the 
inside by a defensive tower. After the annexation of Navane to Castile, a boom in 
defensive constmctions was experienced and the Catholic Kings built a castle over the 
old tower, later extended and restored by Charles V [ 4]. 
In mid-sixteenth centu1y this stronghold could be considered as adapted to the principles 
of bastioned fmtification. Towers were lowered as well as walls, and large soil masses 
contained by walls and finished with ashlar masomy reduced the attillety destructive 
effect. The first bastions began to appear. This defensive belt was constmcted 
enveloping the medieval one due to the constr·aints of the tenain, removing or replacing 
towers by bastions. 
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Fig. 3. (Left) Plan of the fortification of Fuentenabia, year 1640, AGS, M.P.D.36-13. 
(Right) Plan of the str·onghold ofFuentenabia, year 1641, AGS, M.P.D. 39-28 
But the truth is that the real transfmmation occuned once the modem design of the 
bastion had matured. As shown in figure 2, dated around 1530 and the first graphic 
document of these fmtifications preserved in the AGS (Archivo General de Simancas), 
two herut-shaped bastions were planned: the Imperial bastion and the Leyva bastion. 
The same had happened in Pamplona with the bastion of San Llorente or San Lorenzo 
[5], built after the Castilian Cmtes of 1532 where it was intended to undettake without 
fail the completion of the fmtifications. The remaining bastions that were built were 
significantly smaller, canied out two during those years: The Queen bastion and a 
pentagonal one in the new wall. According to Astiazaniin, they were the work of Pedro 
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de Guevara and Benedito Ravenna, who had replaced the prestigious engineer Gabriel 
Ladino di Martinengo [4]. A few years lateJr, other bastions of larger scale and rutillery 
assets were undertaken, such as Magdalena and San Nicolas bastions. Modifications of 
existing defences were made, but until the siege of 1638, the only constmction that was 
canied out was the stronghold of San Felipe. The Fratin, chief engineer of the kingdom 
under the reign of Philip II, decided to build! this bastion of higher capacity in the south. 
The work was canied out with the changes or adjustments that Tiburcio Spanochi traced 
to 1580, but after his death. 
Fig. 4. View of the Stronghold ofFuentenabia. Municipal Archives of Hondruribia. 
THE SIEGE OF 1638 
The siege of 1638 was significant in the evolution of the walls of Fuentenabia (Fig. 4). 
Both bastioned defence systems and techniques that writers had gathered on the systems 
to besiege a stronghold were tested. By successive approaches, beating the walls and 
mines, they tried to open a breach through which the invading army could enter and take 
the village. The consequences on the walls; involved numerous projects (for exainple, 
Fig. 3) to make the necessary repairs and undertake some outer fmtifications as the 
beginning of a modemization of the enclosure to be held throughout the seventeenth 
century. But even then there were doubts about its usefulness to defend the border 
against new rutillery systems [ 6] . 
In the early spring of that year war mmour was heard. Since the French armies were 
moving and a siege attempt was expected im any stronghold located at the southem side 
of the Pyrenees. Troops began to gather in Navane and Painplona was manned due to 
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this imminent danger. Men and women began to prepare the city walls in order to 
withstand an attack. Moret [7] says the French troops' strategy was to make a feint on 
one side of the border to actually release elsewhere and sunender Fuentenabia more 
easily. 
This militru.y conflict has been described and analysed from a histmical point of view in 
some publications because it 1638 was an impmtant milestone in the histmy of 
Fuentenabia, but most of the times in a ge][leralist way. Even today, the local festivity 
refers to their militru.y success against the French in this episode that lasted sixty nine 
days. However, there is no profound analysis of this siege from a heritage point of view 
[8] [9]. 
There exist two contemporru.y chronicles [7] [10] that describe some details of the siege 
meticulously, and other later document compilations [11] [12] [13] that hy to recall 
almost every impmtant fact of the warfare process. But due to the complexity of the 
nanation it is difficult to understand, even iJf you know the city and its sunoundings. So 
it appeared the need to come up with a method that allowed to synthesize and compare 
the facts, understanding all the infmmation with a glance. The method involves 
organizing the infmmation extracted from the texts obtained after n·acing bibliography 
in simplified sections depending on the specific infmmation selected, also divided in 
besieged and besiegers. Once organized and displayed in a table, it became easier to 
graph the process. fu these diagrams, the sellected infmmation was drawn over a cunent 
orthophotography of the city walls hypothesizing on the exact location, n·aces and 
shapes of the fortification works. 
After a daily simplified defmition of the siege process, where each day has a datasheet, 
a summa1y of eve1y different sections taken into account is done. The French offensive 
was divided into the mines excavated, the mtillery offensive and the consequences on 
the city walls. The besieged counteroffensive was defined by the constiuctions built in 
order to repair, improve the defences of the city or reduce the effect of the enemy's 
offensive. 
FRENCH OFFENSIVE 
Location and movements of the French n·oops can be dete1mined through hypothesis 
suppmted by the text extracts and the theoretical knowledge of the time captured in 
a1tille1y n·eatises [14]. Therefore, the enemy approached the city sunounding it and 
standing at sn·ategic places where they were protected. 
Mines offensive 
The French began building approach trenches from almost the beginning of the site. 
From the fifth day of the siege the constiuction of new n·enches against the bulwark of 
Reyna began, which also advanced to the stronghold of Leyva. More and more branches 
n·ied to approach by several points to the moat and the walls. 
Once anived to the counterscarp, they could continue and cross the moat with a covered 
n·ench or an underground galle1y. Mines excavation took time because of the 
labmiousness involved in canying out the work while hying to be safe from the 
besieged offensive, who sought to delay the:m. Due to these circumstances, the attacker 
did not get results from these works until the site was advanced. 
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Fig. 5. Ways to approach the fortification through trenches on the left and through 
mines on the right. Planches 46 and 47 from the treatise by Antoine de Ville [14]. 
Fig. 6. Trenches and mines built by the French during the 69 days of the siege overlayed 
with a 2012 photography by the municipality ofFuentenabia. Own production. 
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Focusing on the success of these, we can dete1mine that only four mines exploded 
controllably: two on the bastion of the Magdalene and the other two on the bastion of 
the Queen. From these, only the explosion of the 51st day of the siege on the bastion of 
the Magdalene opened a breach, but it was not sufficient so the attackers could enter, 
and other one breached the bastion of the Queen on the 67th day of the siege. French did 
not entered because the Spanish relief troops where already on the site [10]. 
The French strategy was clear: insisting on a single area of the wall to get enough result 
to attempt an entrance. But it was hard to achieve this goal only mining. Sometimes due 
to nature elements, other times due to the besieged actions and exceptionally due to 
unfortunate accidents. But the indisputable fact is that in this type of fortification is the 
most effective method. A well-made mine: and exploding at the calculated time and 
location caused ineparable damage to the wall, either breaching or creating significant 
damage to facilitate access, as happened for example when the mins filled the moat on 
the 40th day [7]. 
Artillery offensive 
Meanwhile, as an attempt to breach the walls, the French continued beating the walls 
with all the artillety batteries placed mainly at seven points around the fmtification, 
regardless of the fmts on the Jaizquibel Mount [10]. Each one targeted a pa1t of the 
fmtification intending to min it. Six of them were located in the Spanish pa1t: there were 
two batteries located on the banks of the river, at the nmth of the fmtification against 
the bastion of the Magdalene; another one next to the Basilica of St. Ma1y Magdalene, 
also in front of the same bastion but located fmther from the shore to the west; a couple 
of batteries facing directly the bastion of Le:yva and the Queen respectively; and a fmal 
battety in the hill of the Grace, just above the shrine of Our Lady of Grace [13]. The 
seventh battery is located on the French shore, on a sandbank known as Onda.tTaizu 
opposite the bastion of the Magdalene, as shown in figure 7. 
The French effmt focused on beating the west pa1t of the city (bastions from nmth so 
south in this side: Magdalene, Leyva. and the Queen). The topography of the area. not 
only allowed the French to be protected, but also to place their artille1y in dominating 
areas taking advantage of the higher points. Being aware of this weakness, the city walls 
were especially fmtified on this orientation. This reinforcement can be seen in the 
evolution of the fmtifications until 1638, where military engineers noticed this need due 
to the sunoundings of Fuentenabia. The other orientation was self-protected by the 
tiver and marshland that restricted the enemy's offensive. 
However, this front still was the easiest to attack. The French battered during the first 
half of the siege process the defenses of Leyva and Magdalena. It is notewmthy that the 
most intense attacks occuned between days 40 and 45, from all batteries to the Leyva. 
bastion, and showed the French interest to breach the walls after almost month and a 
half of siege with no result. 
As a direct effect of the attacks, on the 12th day the houses located over the city walls 
cm·done were mined [7]. The 30th day the: cannon located in the wall of the gabions 
between the bulwark and Magdalena de Leyva. was disabled. From day 40th, the bastion 
of Leyva was first mined pa1tially, fmally falling apa1t after one side was breached. 
Leyva. was the most exposed bastion to aitilllety attack since both sides could be reached 
from almost any battety located on Mount Jaizquibel. The bastion of the Queen was a. 
little less accessible to be attacked in this way, because though one side was sensitive to 
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batteries attack the other could only be reached by the guns located on the hill of Grace. 
Something similar happened with the bastion of the Magdalene, its side facing the sea 
and could only be reached by mtille1y fired Jfrom the French bank of the Bidasoa River. 
Fig. 7. Altillety ofensive by the French during the 69 days of the siege overlayed with a 
2012 ae1ial photography owned by the municipality ofFuentenabia. Own production. 
Consequences in the fortification 
The tmth is that the combination of all the attacks, including a1tilleiy and mines, was 
what produced more destructive effect. In tbte end, each one had the immediate effect of 
reducing the str·ength of the walls, but any one of them could exceed the resistance limit 
mining totally o partially the walls. The most significant damage occmTed in all the 
elements oriented towm·ds the west, all those pruts of the f01tress among the bastion of 
the Queen and the bastion of the Magdalene (figure 8). 
Analysing as its elements independently, the str·onghold of the Magdalena suffered 
damage in three different periods of the second half of the siege. The fust attempt to 
breach the wall was by breaking different pmts, achieving to open a breach. In the third 
period they focused on breaching the walls by the explosion of a mine. There were 
many attempts but never achieved enough gap to enter. Regarding the bastion of Leyva, 
two periods were developed principally quite similar to the mentioned. There was a 
pa1tial demolition of the left side and the besieged levelled it. The second was a 
cmmbling in patts until eve1ything was demolished, opening up a gap on the right side. 
In the bastion of the Queen the damage occuned in a more continuous manner at the 
end of the period of siege. French sought to demolish the bastion by several subsequent 
days chipping on several points, but the most destructive effect occuned with the mines 
explosion. Although the opened a gap, they 'continued building mines. 
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Fig. 8. Damages produced during the 69 days of the siege overlayed with a 2012 aerial 
photography owned by the municipality of Fuenten abia. Own production. 
The walls between these three bastions were minor target of the attacks. They tiied to 
broke them in several places, even mined them, but from inside they quickly 
counterattacked by throwing all kinds of items from the wall or building counte1m ines 
to quickly cut the mines. 
SPANISH COUNTEROFFENSIVE AND ITS EFFECT ON FORTIFICATION 
Slightly could be done by the besieged within repairs and reinforcements of damaged 
walls. They increased with gabions those p;uts who lost the cm·done. The works of the 
insiders to resist longer had more to do with reducing the impact of the mines and evade 
the French enti-y than to repair damaged walls. 
The besieged also had several pieces of a1tille1-y that counterattacked the French, 
slowing their galleries and ti·enches. However, the a1tillei-y capability inside the 
sti·onghold was considerably lower. Therefore, effmts focused on building works to 
delay the enti-y of the French, either reducing the impact of its mines in case of 
explosion or obstiu cting the access if they b~reached the wall. 
In the first case, the only way to counteract the mines was to fmd them before the 
explosion and open ducts to the outside that reduced their effect. For this purpose, 
digging works known as counte1mines were built. They required the presence of a 
milita1-y expe1t with experience in this field 1to explain the besieged how and where to do 
these underground galleries through which they tried to approach the enemy's mines. If 
the French were aware that they had been located, they tried to fire the mine as soon as 
possible to produce the greatest possible damage. 
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Fig. 9. Spanish works dming the 69 days of the siege overlayed with a 2012 aerial 
photography owned by the municipality of Fuentenabia. Own production. 
Numerous works were built in the three bastions (figme 9) and two walls located in 
between. The countemrines made in the lbastion of the Magdalene were excavated 
especially near the left angle of the bastion (facing west). Of these, two managed to 
finally reach the mines and dismantle them. However, in the stronghold of the Queen 
just one counte1mine was built, because there was no need due to the trench excavated 
that created a gap behind the bricked gates and would vent the mine in case it exploded 
[7]. The rest of counte1mines were built in the wall of St. Nichola.s, near the bastion of 
the Queen. As they failed to find the mines, they built a series of works in the same area 
but inside the wall to protect themselves if any outbreak was achieved at that point. 
In the second case, there were several ways to obstmct the enemy once breached the 
wall. Most of them were building up any dement to protect the defender in case the 
enemy entered, whether a trench, a parapet or a safe back. In some cases, a stockade or 
embankment. In tills siege, the first mechanism was to brick the pmtals except the one 
looking at Hendaye [7], because they needed a back gate to exit and attack the besieging 
troops. W mth noting the large number of works made in the bastion of the Queen. 
Dming the last ten days of the site they built: a retreat, two stockades and an 
embankment that first day; a trench and ;a redoubt. Other works were done on the 
bastion of the Magdalene, where a safe back against the wall that enclosed the bastion 
was built. They also did a cutting and embankment built with the soil extracted wlrile 
digging the counte1mine. Apa1t from this, al safe back on the bastion of Leyva and the 
ammunition store, as they were receiving heavy fire from all the batteries. 
The usefulness of counte1mines became obvious when those mines wlrich were given 
fire generated minor damages on the fmtification. However, it is more difficult to assess 
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the utility of other works, since French tmops never did a deep incursion into the 
stronghold to demonstrate the patent advantage of these protective elements. After the 
sixty nine days of siege, the rescue troops anived and the enemy withdrew [12] [13]. 
Fig. 10. Cunent view of the fmtified town ofFuentenabia obtained from Bing Maps. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Know how projects of bastioned fmtifications were made, what damages suffered in 
wars throughout history and what campaign fmtifications were built allow us to 
recognize their relevancy leading to the understanding and treatment of milita1y heritage 
conservation. 
Unlike other sieges where they attacked on several fronts, in the siege of Fuentenabia of 
1638 the fmtification was attacked by only two fronts due to the counter-slope 
favouring the attacker. The location of the ~enemy at higher points than the stronghold, 
in contraindication of poliorcetic themies, reduced attacking distances from up to 500m 
to almost a half. The impmtance of the expe1t ise of the milita1y engineers of the time, 
both as attackers besieged, as evidenced throughout the mine and countennine 
trajectories. The besieged made few repair works because it was more useful to 
reinforce the weak points through which the enemy could enter. 
From these direct conclusions are drawn others, such that although this siege followed 
all the maxims of how a stronghold should be attacked (e.g. attacking a1my 10 times 
superior in number, to breach the defences, ... ) nor was urgent for the French will open 
breach in the wall nor was there a msh to reach or to send relief troops to the stronghold 
to end the attempted takeover of the villa. This was because it was not an isolated 
incident and the attempted siege was pa1t of a tenitorial war. 
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The prospective of this work is related with the application of this methodology in other 
war episodes, physical transfo1mations of th.e walls or other strongholds in a systematic, 
brief and intelligible way. It facilitates the c:ommunication and dissemination of results, 
not only in literature but also in museums, exhibitions, visitor centers and other means 
of dissemination. 
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